This page allows you to generate random passwords using true randomness, which for many purposes is better than the pseudo-random number algorithms typically used. It’s more an issue of /dev/random blocking until there’s sufficient entropy is built up to generate the secure key. @hardoverflow You could easily prove or disprove this by checking for the existence of the zwave network key. In HABmin, go to the Z-Wave Serial Controller thing. About Random Username Generator Tool. Username is just as important as the email address. When registering a lot of websites, you need to provide the username. With a good username, you can make you stand out. This page generates 80 usernames each time. Some usernames sound cool, some usernames funny and some usernames cute. Security Z-Wave devices require a network key before being added to the network using the Add Secure Node button in the Z-Wave Network Management card. You must set the networkkey configuration variable to use a network key before adding these devices. WPA encryption Key Generator Create a WPA Key This tool generate a WPA encryption key that you can use to secure your Wireless network. Generate the WPA Encryption key, copy it and paste it into your wireless router's configuration panel.
Adding Non-Secure Devices
To add (include) a non-secure Z-Wave device to your system:
- Go to the Z-Wave control panel in the Home Assistant frontend
- Click the Add Node button in the Z-Wave Network Management card - this will place the controller in inclusion mode
- Activate your device to be included by following the instructions provided with the device
- With the device in its final location, run a Heal Network
Don’t use this for secure devices, since this is likely to limit the features the device supports.
Don’t use the OpenZWave control panel (OZWCP), or the physical button on a controller, to add or remove devices. Many devices will only send the information about their capabilities at the time you include them. If you use the OpenZWave control panel, or the button on a device, then Home Assistant won’t have that information. Eve online cd key generator free. Using the physical button on a controller will also result in a non-security inclusion being performed, which may limit the features the device supports.
When you add a device, it may initially appear without a specific entity ID (e.g.,
zwave.__
) and without other identifying information. Running a Heal should help speed this process up, and you’ll need to run a Heal anyway so that all the devices in your Z-Wave network learn about the new device. You might need to restart Home Assistant (not reboot the system) to have the entity ID fully visible.Network Key
Security Z-Wave devices require a network key. Some devices only expose their full capabilities when included this way. You should always read the manual for your device to find out the recommended inclusion method. Note, secure devices that had been connected to another hub/network in the past may have a “theft protection” feature which requires to first exclude the device successfully from the previous hub using the previous hub/Software setup before it can be enrolled in a new hub/network.
A valid network key will be a 16 byte value, defined in the Z-Wave section of your configuration, such as the following example:
Each individual value in the defined key can be anywhere from 0x00 to 0xFF. Define your own key by making changes to the above example key or for additional security try one of the two scripts mentioned below.
Network Key
An easy script to generate a random key:
On macOS, this script will generate a random key:
If the above command doesn’t work then replace
LC_CTYPE=C
with LC_ALL=C
:Ensure you keep a backup of this key. If you have to rebuild your system and don't have a backup of this key, you won't be able to reconnect to any security devices. This may mean you have to do a factory reset on those devices, and your controller, before rebuilding your Z-Wave network.
Adding Secure Devices
After defining your network key, follow these steps to add (include) a secure Z-Wave device:
- Go to the Z-Wave control panel in the Home Assistant frontend
- Click the Add Node Secure button in the Z-Wave Network Management card - this will place the controller in inclusion mode
- Activate your device to be included by following the instructions provided with the device
- With the device in its final location, run a Heal Network
Secure devices require additional bandwidth, and too many secure devices can slow down your Z-Wave network. We recommend only using secure inclusion for devices that require it, such as locks.
Removing Devices
To remove (exclude) a Z-Wave device from your system:
- Go to the Z-Wave control panel in the Home Assistant frontend
- Click the Remove Node button in the Z-Wave Network Management card - this will place the controller in exclusion mode
- Activate your device to be excluded by following the instructions provided with the device
- The device will now be removed, but that won’t show until you restart Home Assistant
- Run a Heal Network so all the other nodes learn about its removal
If your device isn’t responding to this process, possibly because you’ve factory reset it or it has failed, you can remove it using Remove Failed Node. This only works for devices marked as
'is_failed': true
, but you can trick the system into thinking that this the case:- https://historypowerful.weebly.com/generate-public-key-windows-server.html. Go to the States menu under Developer tools in the Home Assistant frontend
- Click on the name of the
zwave.
entity you want to remove - Make note of the entity’s “node_id” value as you will need to re-add the “node_id” attribute and value in step 4.
- At the top, edit the JSON attributes to replace
false
withtrue
for'is_failed': false,
so that it reads'is_failed': true.
Also add the “node_id” value to the number listed in the entity’s attribute. The JSON attributes should look something like below: - Click Set State
- Go to the Z-Wave control panel in the Home Assistant frontend
- Click the Remove Failed Node button in the Z-Wave Node Management card
- The device will now be removed, but that won’t show until you restart Home Assistant
Generate Random Aes Key
Troubleshooting
Windows xp home sp3 key. Sometimes devices won’t add to Home Assistant. There are a couple of possible problems.
- You’re not using all Z-Wave Plus devices, in which case the device can’t use the mesh to be added, and must be in the same room as your controller.
- The device was previously added to another controller, and not removed. You’ll need to follow the process above for removing devices first, then try adding it again.
Perfect Passwords GRC's Ultra High Security Password Generator | |
2,618 sets of passwords generated per day 33,542,885 sets of passwords generated for our visitors |
not simple. So here is some totally random raw material, generated just for YOU, to start with. Every time this page is displayed, our server generates a unique set of custom, high quality, cryptographic-strength password strings which are safe for you to use: |
64 random hexadecimal characters (0-9 and A-F):
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63 random printable ASCII characters:
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63 random alpha-numeric characters (a-z, A-Z, 0-9):
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Click your web browser's 'refresh' button a few times and watch the password strings change each time. What makes these perfect and safe? Every one is completely random (maximum entropy) without any pattern, and the cryptographically-strong pseudo random number generator we use guarantees that no similar strings will ever be produced again. Also, because this page will only allow itself to be displayed over a snoop-proof and proxy-proof high-security SSL connection, and it is marked as having expired back in 1999, this page which was custom generated just now for you will not be cached or visible to anyone else. Therefore, these password strings are just for you. No one else can ever see them or get them. You may safely take these strings as they are, or use chunks from several to build your own if you prefer, or do whatever you want with them. Each set displayed are totally, uniquely yours — forever. The 'Application Notes' section below discusses various aspects of using these random passwords for locking down wireless WEP and WPA networks, for use as VPN shared secrets, as well as for other purposes. The 'Techie Details' section at the end describes exactly how these super-strong maximum-entropy passwords are generated (to satisfy the uber-geek inside you). |
Application Notes: A note about 'random' and 'pseudo-random' terminology: Throughout this page I use the shorthand term 'random' instead of the longer but more precise term 'pseudo-random'. I use the output of this page — myself — for any purpose, without hesitation, any time I need a chunk of randomness because there is no better place to find anything more trusted, random and safe. The 'pseudo-randomness' of these numbers does not make them any less good. There are ways to generate absolutely random numbers, but computer algorithms cannot be used for that, since, by definition, no deterministic mathematical algorithm can generate a random result. Electrical and mechanical noise found in chaotic physical systems can be tapped and used as a source of true randomness, but this is much more than is needed for our purposes here. High quality algorithms are sufficient. The deterministic binary noise generated by my server, which is then converted into various displayable formats, is derived from the highest quality mathematical pseudo-random algorithms known. In other words, these password strings are as random as anything non-random can be. This page's password 'raw material': The raw password material is provided in several formats to support its use in many different applications. https://historypowerful.weebly.com/blog/fifa-15-key-generator-app. Each of the password strings on the page is generated independently of every other, based upon its own unique pseudo-random binary data. So there is no underlying similarity in the data among the various format passwords. 64 hex characters = 256 binary bits: |
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Each of the 64 hexadecimal characters encodes 4 bits of binary data, so the entire 64 characters is equivalent to 256 binary bits — which is the actual binary key length used by the WiFi WPA pre-shared key (PSK). Some WPA-PSK user interfaces (such as the one in Windows XP) allows the 256-bit WPA pre-shared key to be directly provided as 64 hexadecimal characters. This is a precise means for supplying the WPA keying material, but it is ONLY useful if ALL of the devices in a WPA-protected WiFi network allow the 256-bit keying material to be specified as raw hex. If any device did not support this mode of specification (and most do not) it would not be able to join the network. Using fewer hex characters for WEP encryption: If some of your WiFi network cannot support the newer and much stronger (effectively unbreakable when used with maximum-entropy keys like these) WPA encryption system, you'll be forced either to run two WiFi networks in parallel (which is totally feasible — one super-secure and one at lower security) or to downgrade your entire network to weaker WEP encryption. Still, ANY encryption is better than no encryption. WEP key strength (key length) is sometimes confusing because, although there are only two widely accepted standard lengths, 40-bit and 104-bit, those lengths are sometimes confused by adding the 24-bit IV (initialization vector) counter to the length, resulting in 64-bit and 128-bit total key lengths. However, the user only ever specifies a key of either 40 or 104 binary bits. Since WEP keys should always be specified in their hexadecimal form to guarantee device interaction, and since each hex digit represents 4 binary bits of the key, 40 and 104 bit keys are represented by 10 and 26 hex digits respectively. So you may simply snip off whatever length of random hex characters you require for your system's WEP key. Note that if all of your equipment supports the use of the new longer 256/232 bit WEP keys, you would use 232/4 or 58 hexadecimal characters for your pre-shared key. 63 printable ASCII characters hashed down to 256 binary bits: |
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The more 'standard' means for specifying the 256-bits of WPA keying material is for the user to specify a string of up to 63 printable ASCII characters. This string is then 'hashed' along with the network's SSID designation to form a cryptographically strong 256-bit result which is then used by all devices within the WPA-secured WiFi network. (The ASCII character set was updated to remove SPACE characters since a number of WPA devices were not handling spaces as they should.) The 63 alphanumeric-only character subset: |
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If some device was not following the WiFi Alliance WPA specification by not hashing the entire printable ASCII character set correctly, it would end up with a different 256-bit hash result than devices that correctly obeyed the specification. It would then be unable to connect to any network that uses the full range of printable ASCII characters. Since we have heard unconfirmed anecdotal reports of such non-compliant WPA devices (and since you might have one), this page also offers 'junior' WPA password strings using only the 'easy' ASCII characters which even any non-fully-specification-compliant device would have to be able to properly handle. If you find that using the full random ASCII character set within your WPA-PSK protected WiFi network causes one of your devices to be unable to connect to your WPA protected access point, you can downgrade your WPA network to 'easy ASCII' by using one of these easy keys. And don't worry for a moment about using an easy ASCII key. If you still use a full-length 63 character key, your entire network will still be EXTREMELY secure. And PLEASE drop us a line to let us know that you have such a device and what it is! Shorter pieces are random too: A beneficial property of these maximum entropy pseudo-random passwords is their lack of 'inter-symbol memory.' This means that in a string of symbols, any of the possible password symbols is equally likely to occur next. This is important if your application requires you to use shorter password strings. Any 'sub-string' of symbols will be just as random and high quality as any other. When does size matter? The use of these maximum-entropy passwords minimizes (essentially zeroes) the likelihood of successful 'dictionary attacks' since these passwords won't appear in any dictionary. So you should always try to use passwords like these. When these passwords are used to generate pre-shared keys for protecting WPA WiFi and VPN networks, the only known attack is the use of 'brute force' — trying every possible password combination. Brute force attackers hope that the network's designer (you) were lazy and used a shorter password for 'convenience'. So they start by trying all one-character passwords, then two-character, then three and so on, working their way up toward longer random passwords.
Note that while this 'the longer the better' rule of thumb is always true, long passwords won't protect legacy WEP-protected networks due to well known and readily exploited weaknesses in the WEP keying system and its misuse of WEP's RC4 encryption. With WEP protection, even a highly random maximum-entropy key can be cracked in a few hours. (Listen to Security Now! episode #11 for the full story on cracking WEP security.) The Techie Details: Since its introduction, this Perfect Passwords page has generated a great deal of interest. A number of people have wished to duplicate this page on their own sites, and others have wanted to know exactly how these super-strong and guaranteed-to-be-unique never repeating passwords are generated. The following diagram and discussion provides full disclosure of the pseudo-random number generating algorithm I employed to create the passwords on this page: |
![Zwave Zwave](/uploads/1/2/6/0/126089852/593560517.png)
![Generate random username Generate random username](/uploads/1/2/6/0/126089852/151957084.png)
Generate Random Key
While the diagram above might at first seem a bit confusing, it is a common and well understood configuration of standard cryptographic elements. A succinct written description of the algorithm would read: 'Rijndael (AES) block encryption of never-repeating counter values in CBC mode.' CBC stands for 'Cipher Block Chaining' and, as I describe in detail in the second half of Security Now! Episode #107, CBC provides necessary security in situations where some repetition or predictability of the 'plaintext' message is present. Since the 'plaintext' in this instance is a large 128-bit steadily-increasing (monotonic) counter value (which gives us our guaranteed never-to-repeat property, but is also extremely predictable) we need to scramble it so that the value being encrypted cannot be predicted. This is what 'CBC' does: As the diagram above shows, the output from the previous encryption operation is 'fed back' and XOR-mixed with the incrementing counter value. This prevents the possibility of determining the secret key by analysing successive counter encryption results. One last detail: Since there is no 'output from the previous encryption' to be used during the encryption of the first block, the switch shown in the diagram above is used to supply a 128-bit 'Initialization Vector' (which is just 128-bits of secret random data) for the XOR-mixing of the first counter value. Thus, the first encryption is performed on a mixture of the 128-bit counter and the 'Initialization Vector' value, and subsequent encryptions are performed on the mixture of the incrementing counter and the previous encrypted result. The result of the combination of the 256-bit Rijndael/AES secret key, the unknowable (therefore secret) present value of the 128-bit monotonically incrementing counter, and the 128-bit secret Initialization Vector (IV) is 512-bits of secret data providing extremely high security for the generation of this page's 'perfect passwords'. No one is going to figure out what passwords you have just received. How much security do 512 binary bits provide? Well, 2^512 (2 raised to the power of 512) is the total number of possible combinations of those 512 binary bits — every single bit of which actively participates in determining this page's successive password sequence. 2^512 is approximately equal to: 1.34078079 x 10^154, which is this rather amazing number:
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Random Wave Generator
Gibson Research Corporation is owned and operated by Steve Gibson. The contents of this page are Copyright (c) 2016 Gibson Research Corporation. SpinRite, ShieldsUP, NanoProbe, and any other indicated trademarks are registered trademarks of Gibson Research Corporation, Laguna Hills, CA, USA. GRC's web and customer privacy policy. |